Aircraft and spacecraft pilots frequently change their level of supervisory control between full autopilot and other modes, providing varying levels of manual control. Therefore, multimodal systems must transition "gracefully," meaning without unsafe decreases in flight performance or unacceptable changes in workload or situation awareness. Thirteen subjects flew a fixed base simulation of the NASA Constellation Program Altair lunar lander that transitioned from full autopilot to one of three flight-director-guided rate-command attitude hold manual control modes. After training, each subject flew 24 approaches, half of which included a landing point redesignation at the time of the mode transition requiring the pilot to null additional guidance errors. Bedford subjective workload and two-choice embedded secondary task response times were used to quantify temporal changes in mental workload. Situation awareness transients were detected by analysis of a tertiary task, verbal callouts of altitude, fuel, and terrain hazards. Graceful transitions were particularly difficult because Altair's large inertia made the plant dynamics relatively sluggish. Transitions to manual control increased subjective and objective workloads and decreased callout accuracy in proportion to the number of flight control axes being manually commanded.
I. Introduction
M ANY large transport aircraft and spacecraft, such as the Apollo Lunar Landing Module and the U.S. Space Shuttle, were designed to be capable of almost fully automatic landing. Future spacecraft may be capable of fully automatic landings when used for uncrewed missions (e.g., [1] ). However, in crewed systems, pilots generally insist on the availability of manual control modes, allowing them to change from full supervisory mode to some level of manual control, e.g., while reprogramming an approach route or to diagnose a system failure [2] . For example, airline pilots can choose to engage heading, altitude, and/or thrust autoflight modes or control each of them manually. NASA spacecraft human rating requirements [3] dictate that astronauts must be able to manually override higherlevel software control/automation and control spacecraft attitude and flight path. Following the dictum "fly as you train, train as you fly," both astronauts and aircraft pilots practice transitioning between automation modes and often choose to fly part or all of an approach using manual modes, often aided by flight director guidance.
Automation design heuristics [4] , theories of supervisory control [5] , and level-of-automation (LOA) taxonomies [6] [7] [8] were initially developed for teleoperation, powerplant, and air traffic control applications but only bluntly characterize the manual control options available in modern autoflight systems. Employing a high LOA lowers the mental workload and improves the overall situation awareness (SA), but remaining engaged at a low LOA keeps the pilot aware of the aircraft state and more able to detect and respond to certain failures (e.g., [9] ). It has long been recognized that the LOA must vary during operational use depending on situational demands. However, some aircraft autoflight system modes are clumsy and unpredictable [10] , complicating mode awareness [11] [12] [13] [14] and resulting in transitions that surprise even experienced operators [10, 15] . Mode transitions reduce operator performance in error detection and error mitigation in automated systems [2, 9, 16, 17] . The need for aircraft and spacecraft automations that support graceful reversion from automatic to manual flight has long been recognized (e.g., [18] [19] [20] ). Previous studies of the effects of the LOA (e.g., [21] ) assess performance, mental workload, and situation awareness but have focused on steady-state behavior rather than the transient. In aviation, pilots and their instructor evaluators typically speak of the "gracefulness" of a specific mode transition, referring to the undesirable decrease in operator performance, increase in workload, and change in situation awareness associated with a mode transition, even when the transition is expected, and so automation surprise is not an additional factor. Because each dimension of this gracefulness construct can be quantified, it provides a useful three-dimensional metric for the evaluation of the transient effect of mode transitions. To date, no studies have attempted to quantify such transient effects of the reversion to manual flight in terms of concurrently measured manual control performance, subjective and objective mental workloads, and situation awareness and how these depend on transition characteristics such as the change in the number of manual control loops the operator must control. This study examined these questions in the context of a lunar landing scenario, but there are potentially broader applications.
Automation of control functions previously assigned to a human operator often improves the overall system performance and reliability, can significantly decrease operator workload [22] , and can improve failure detection [23, 24] . These benefits typically come at the cost of potential operator complacency [9] , skill degradation [2] , and the inability of operators to diagnose and respond to subsystem failures [25] . To enhance operational flexibility and operator confidence, a variety of automation modes are typically provided. Within a particular system mode, the role of the human operator may range from the supervisory level (e.g., human specifies a series of high-level goals and simply monitors the execution) to a level in which the human both sets goals and executes low-level manual commands. This range of interactions has been referred to as the LOA [8] . Systems frequently have numerous modes; for example, the autoflight systems on large commercial aircraft have several dozen heading-, altitude-, and trust-related modes. Systems are typically designed so that some modes operate concurrently, and certain mode transitions occur automatically or can be only selected if certain conditions are met. Various error conditions can cause the automation to initiate a reversion to manual flight, but the operator typically retains authority to choose the subsequent LOA ("adaptable automation" [26] ). The alternative of designing the automation so that it monitors or anticipates pilot performance, workload, and situation awareness and selects the appropriate LOA (adaptive automation) is being explored [27, 28] . The issue is whether such systems can reliably evaluate the situation and estimate pilot performance, workload, and situation awareness. So far, the consensus is that the human should usually retain the LOA decision authority [29] .
The classic "crossover" mathematical model for multiloop manual control [30] predicts that, when flying in a manual mode, the performance of the combined human-operator-vehicle system (as measured by the closed-loop system bandwidth) depends on vehicle dynamics and the ability of the operator to anticipate vehicle behavior and create control "lead." Manual control performance decreases as a function of the number of information loops the operator must sample and close. Increasing the number of manual control loops increases pilot mental workload as measured experimentally by side task performance (e.g., [31] ). Human operators can successfully adapt to sudden changes in vehicle dynamics [32, 33] , though under conditions of high "urgency," unexpected input disturbances, changes in vehicle dynamics, pilot attention, or mode of manual control can cause loss of operator lead, resulting in excessive control gain and pilot-induced oscillations [34] . Despite these various studies, human operator performance, mental workload, and situation awareness have not been concurrently quantified during the period of transition from full autopilot to various manual modes.
Mental workload can be defined as the fraction of an operator's limited capacity used to perform a task [35] . An operator's information processing and attentional capacity in various sensory channels (e.g., visual, auditory) [36] are limited. At moderate and high workload levels, performance normally remains constant until spare attentional capacity is nearly exhausted. Mental workload is therefore typically measured via the assessment of spare attentional capacity, either directly employing subjective scales of spare attention, such as the hierarchical modified Bedford workload scale [37] [38] [39] or by quantifying performance on a secondary task. We employed both techniques in this study. When a secondary task is used to assess mental workload, it should use the same sensory resources as the primary task but be performed only as the attentional demands of the primary task permit. Manual control places high demands on visual attention. Visual reaction time secondary tasks that impose a continuing cognitive demand are frequently used, involving varying degrees of processing complexity [35] . Embedded secondary visual monitoring tasks that are part of the operator's normal role have face validity. One technique requires the operator to indicate which of two peripherally displayed indicators has appeared [31] . As compared to a single indicator response task, the two-choice task requires decision making. A similar secondary task was used in this study. By controlling the time of appearance of the secondary indicator, it is also possible to quantify how mental workload/spare attention varies temporally after the automation mode changes. This use of a timed two-choice response task to probe short-term variations in mental workload, detailed next, is new.
SA can be generally defined as "the perception of the elements in the environment with respect to time and/or space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future" [40, 41] . The subject's perception of their own awareness has been assessed using of subjective scales (e.g., Situation Awareness Rating Technique [42] ), but such ratings are limited by the subject's own perceptions of reality. Similarly, ratings by expert observers (e.g., SALSA [43] ) are constrained because observers may have only limited knowledge of the operator's concept of the situation [21] . Objective measures are traditionally obtained via analysis of answers to questions administered during simulation freezes (e.g., Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique [41] ) or by measuring the reaction time to probe questions related to the displayed information (e.g., SPAM [44] ). However, we wanted to be able to assess short-term temporal changes in critical SA variables without the intrusion of simulation freezes or distracting probe questions or reliance on posttrial memories. We therefore analyzed the timeliness and accuracy of the required verbal callouts of altitude, fuel, and terrain, which our pilot subjects made during their approach to landing. Many experienced pilots employ "self-talk" during instrument approaches, verbalizing important situational variables, employing phonologic working memory in order to stabilize their attention patterns and instrument scan (e.g., [45, 46] ). This is a new method of assessing task critical elements of SA and has relatively high face validity because Apollo Lunar Module (LM) astronauts also called out altitude, fuel, and terrain features.
The goal of the current study was to quantify flying performance, subjective and objective workloads, and situation awareness during various types of automation mode transitions, in order to develop objective measures of mode transition gracefulness. We hypothesized that reversion from autoflight to a flight control mode requiring the operator to close a larger number of manual control information loops would impose a higher attentional mental workload and would therefore have a larger detrimental effect on manual control performance, mental workload, and aspects of situational awareness not immediately related to the manual control task. We also hypothesized that the mental workload would increase and situation awareness would decrease monotonically with the number of manual control loops the pilot had to close. Because the lunar landing vehicle dynamics were relatively challenging to manually control, we also wanted to confirm that, if large guidance errors were suddenly introduced when the landing point was redesignated, the additional task of reducing this error would increase workload and decrease situation awareness, as compared to cases in which there was no redesignation.
II. Methodology

A. Lunar Lander Simulator Displays
The subjects were trained to fly approaches in a fixed-base lunar lander simulator. Seated subjects viewed a primary flight display (PFD) on a monitor at eye level and approximately arm's length distance and a horizontal situation display (HSD), located immediately to the right of the PFD. As shown in Fig. 1 (bottom left) , the PFD depicted the vehicle pitch and roll attitude (earth/sky horizon, pitch ladder, and roll indicator), heading and horizontal velocity (on a horizontal situation indicator), altitude, altitude rate (vertical velocity) using symbology adapted from aircraft and helicopter electronic flight instrument displays [47, 48] , percentage of fuel remaining, and the estimated time until touchdown. The active autopilot flight control mode was shown on an annunciator panel at the top of the PFD. To reduce pilot workload, magenta "flight director" lines were presented on the attitude indicator, heading display, and altitude rate displays showing reference values determined by the guidance system such that, if the pilot "flew to" them, the vehicle flight path would converge with the reference trajectory to the selected landing target.
As shown in Fig. 1 (right) , the HSD displayed a lunar terrain elevation map (plan view, heading up) with gray-shaded elevation contours. The vehicle location in the horizontal plane was depicted by an "ownship" symbol, which remained at the center of the HSD, and so, as the vehicle moved, the terrain map translated and rotated relative to it. The location of three alternative landing points, chosen by the vehicle's hazard detection system [49] , were shown as numbered circles. The currently selected guidance system aimpoint (#2 in the Fig. 1 example) was boxed in magenta, with a digital display of the horizontal range in feet and time until touchdown (min: s). The surface areas that were overflyable but judged unsafe for touchdown were shaded in red. The secondary task display was located at the lower-right corner of the HSD and consisted of a small turquoise circle. Use of the secondary task display, described as a communication (COMM) indicator response, is detailed later.
B. Lunar Lander Dynamics, Guidance, and Control
The subject controlled vehicle attitude using a three-axis joystick held in the right hand. The vehicle dynamics represented those of NASA's Constellation Program "Altair" lunar lander (LDAC1-Delta design). The descent engine had a fixed gimbal; fuel slosh and consumption effects were not modeled. As with the Apollo LM, the joystick provided the pilot with manual rate command-attitude hold (RCAH) control. The thrusters on the Altair LDAC1-Delta were similar to those on the LM, but the Altair had a larger inertia, and so the control authority and maximum rate command was limited (3.0 deg ∕s 2 and 30 deg ∕s in pitch and roll and 2.0 deg ∕s 2 and 20 deg ∕s in yaw). Hence, the joystick deflection determined the attitude rate through first-order lag dynamics with a time constant that was short for small inputs but could be as long as 5 s for maximum rate commands. This sluggish RCAH control characteristic made the vehicle challenging to fly manually when large inputs were required because the dynamics approximated those of a second-order system to attitude and a fourth-order to position over the lunar surface [50] .
Classic multiloop manual control theory [30] explains why such dynamics have relatively poor handling qualities. However, the dual cue flight director provided significant assistance because the pilot could concentrate on following the inner-loop flight director attitude cues and trust that the vehicle would descend very close to the guidance computer's desired flight path. The PFD did not explicitly display lateral or vertical flight-path errors.
As with the Apollo LM, the pilot could manually control the rate of descent (ROD) in increments of 1 ft∕s. In our simulation, the ROD could be commanded using a three-position button on a left-hand inceptor, or the autopilot could automatically control the rate of descent. As the vehicle tilted from the vertical, the guidance system automatically recommended an increase in descent engine thrust in proportion to the cosine of the tilt angle to maintain the commanded ROD. The vehicle ground track approached the primary landing aimpoint from one of the four corners of the terrain map. The guidance laws were designed to follow a reference trajectory that was calculated based on the range to target and the projected time to arrival at a point 150 ft above the selected landing point [51] . This reference trajectory was continually updated based on the actual location of the simulated vehicle in reference to the selected landing point, and the guidance recommended pitch, roll, yaw attitude, and rate of descent was continuously updated and displayed on the PFD. All approaches began at an altitude of 500 ft above the simulated lunar surface, 417 ft from the center of the landing area map (location of the primary aimpoint), a descent rate of 16 ft∕s, a horizontal velocity of 15 ft∕s toward the aimpoint, and pitched and rolled 19 deg in opposition to the horizontal velocity. The descent rate decreased linearly to 3 ft∕s until the vehicle was below 150 ft [51] and within 15 ft horizontally of the designated landing point. This range criterion was kept regardless of control mode. The control system always maintained the vehicle facing north. The experiment was designed to study transitions from fully automatic (FA) mode to one of three manual control modes. In the FA mode, the autopilot controlled the attitude and ROD of the vehicle; the subject had the responsibility of monitoring the vehicle states and performance. The following three manual modes were investigated:
1) "One-axis," which had pitch axis RCAH manual control with automatic rate-of-descent. The autopilot automatically controlled the roll and descent rate and maintained a northerly heading, whereas the pilot manually controlled the pitch.
2) "Three-axis," which had roll-pitch-yaw RCAH manual control with automatic rate of descent. The autopilot controlled the descent rate, whereas the pilot manually controlled the roll, pitch, and yaw.
3) "Three-axis ROD," which had roll-pitch-yaw RCAH manual control with incremental manual control of rate of descent (requiring a total of four-axis manual control). Three-axis ROD is the analog of the "P66" manual control mode used in the Apollo LM during touchdown [52] .
C. Subjects and Experimental Protocol
Thirteen volunteer subjects [10 males, 3 females; 26.2 3.4 (mean standard deviation) years old] participated in the study and were compensated for their time. None withdrew or failed to complete the experiment. The protocol was approved by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects.
The subjects were briefed on the experiment and then flew several practice approaches to familiarize themselves with the displays, controls, and vehicle handling qualities, beginning in FA mode and then with each of the three manual modes. Next, each subject flew 24 trials in a training session practicing the three possible mode transitions with and without landing point redesignations (LPRs), while simultaneously performing the secondary COMM indicator task and the situation awareness verbal callout tertiary task. Finally, each subject flew 24 experimental trials, identical to those in the training session. Each approach was approximately 75 s in duration and terminated just before vehicle touchdown.
Each approach trial began in FA mode. Twenty to twenty-five s later, the vehicle automatically transitioned to one of three alternative manual modes. The subject was alerted by an auditory "beep" and consulted the PFD mode annunciator to determine the new control mode. The subjects were instructed that, in responding to the mode change, they should give first priority to the flight-director-based attitude and rate-of-descent flying tasks, second priority to responding to the COMM indicator for mental workload assessment, and third priority to providing verbal situation awareness callouts of altitude, fuel, and terrain hazards.
In the primary manual control task, the subjects were instructed to null the pitch and roll attitude errors by reference to the flight director needles within 1.0 deg and to keep the descent rate within 0.5 ft∕s of that recommended by guidance. Because these error tolerances were trained to and held constant throughout the experiment and by explicitly presenting vehicle state errors on the PFD, there was no observed change in the subject's manual control gain throughout the trial. The subjects were told to disregard the heading (yaw) flight director cue in all flight control modes. In the FA mode, the vehicle would maintain a northerly heading, and in each of the manual control modes, the heading flight director cue would recommend a heading such that if the pilot yawed the lander it would be facing the direction of the currently selected landing aimpoint. However, the subjects were instructed not to provide any heading (yaw) control inputs.
Half of the approach trials introduced a LPR, in which, at the moment of change to manual mode, the automatic guidance also designated a different landing point further downrange. Because the LPR changed the approach trajectory, it introduced a step change in flight director guidance error, which the pilot was required to manually null. The maximum guidance-commanded pitch and roll angles were limited to 45 deg to reduce the effect of large trajectory errors [51] . When the computer commanded a LPR, the new point was always in the general direction of travel, and the distance change was similar in magnitude for every LPR trial.
The two-choice visual secondary task used to measure mental workload used a turquoise-colored circle displayed on the lowerright portion of the HSD. The circle was labeled "COMM" because the subjects were told that the secondary task was a proxy for a realworld mission control datalink communication task. The subjects were instructed that, as soon as the outer portion of the circle color changed to blue (as shown in Fig. 1 ) or green, they should respond by pushing a correspondingly colored button on their joystick. The response time to each COMM stimulus was recorded as a mental workload measure. The COMM circle appeared a total of 10 times during each approach trial, permitting the assessment of temporal changes. The COMM circle appearance times were deliberately varied within 2 s windows so that the subject could not anticipate the exact time of appearance. If the subject was distracted and failed to respond within 4-6 s, the COMM circle color was reset to turquoise.
For the tertiary SA assessment task, the subjects were instructed to verbally call out vehicle altitude, fuel, and terrain status at specific intervals during the approach. The altitude was to be reported every 50 ft between 450 and 250 ft, every 25 ft between 250 and 150 ft, and every 10 ft below 150 ft altitude. The fuel level was to be reported whenever the integer percentage changed (e.g., 7 to 6%). The subjects were also to report whenever the vehicle was overflying a red hazardous area depicted on the terrain map, e.g., by reporting "entering red" or "departing red". The subjects learned the callout schedule during their familiarization and training trials, and a placard detailing the callouts was available on the simulator panel in front of them, which the subjects could refer to as desired. Each approach trial thus nominally required 21 total situation awareness callouts (14 altitude, 4 fuel level, and 3 hazard crossings). If the pilot kept the vehicle on the reference trajectory, a situation awareness callout would be required approximately every 3 s. Callouts were scored as correct if the report occurred within 1-2 s of the actual event (as determined by the experimenter). After each approach trial, the subjects used the hierarchical modified Bedford workload scale to retrospectively rate their spare attention before, during, and after the control mode transition. "During" the transition was defined as the period beginning with the mode transition and ending when the guidance error needles were nulled and the subject felt in control of the vehicle. The modified Bedford scores could range from 1 ("a piece of cake") through 4 ("there was ample time to attend to additional tasks") and 7 ("there was minimal spare time for additional tasks") to 10 ("adequate performance was impossible"). The subjects were allowed to report using fractions (e.g., 4.5).
D. Experiment Design and Statistical Analysis
The experiment utilized a repeated-measures within-subjects design. Fixed-effect independent variables included the control mode transition type (three levels, from FA to each of the three manual modes) and LPR (two levels, with and without) with four repetitions of each for a total of 24 trials. In order that each approach situation would seem novel, four different approach directions and eight different terrain maps were used. The order of control mode, LPR, and terrain map presentations were in pseudorandomized order to minimize possible learning effects.
Simulator state data were recorded at 10 Hz. The data from the first 69 s of each trial were processed with MATLAB to quantify flight control performance and COMM indicator response times. Analysis on the data from 24 experimental approaches flown by each subject was performed with SYSTAT 13.0 software. Trials in which the vehicle made contact with the lunar surface were omitted from the analysis (nominal trials terminated before landing). In addition, trials with exceptionally large and erroneous control inputs due to selfreported subject fatigue were omitted from analysis. In total, five trials were omitted from the analysis because of subject fatigue or a crash.
Because many of the dependent variables were not normally distributed or were inherently ranked data, we utilized robust nonparametric methods, particularly the Friedman test for ranked data. Bonferroni posthoc corrections were applied when needed. The subjects were considered a random effect. Significant effects by the Friedman test indicate that the trends embracing the entire subject cohort are indeed strong enough to be detected because the Friedman test's efficiency, like that of all nonparametric tests, is lower than that of their parametric counterparts.
The dependent variables for each trial included the 10 COMM indicator response times, 21 SA callouts, and 3 modified Bedford workload scores. Both the COMM indictor response times and SA verbal callouts had clusters of responses close to or at the limits of allowable performance (e.g., see Figs. 2 and 3) causing their distributions to deviate from normal, even after the conventional (Fisher) transformation. We therefore chose the more robust but less efficient alternative analysis through nonparametric statistics that do not assume normality. To compare "inner-loop" manual control performance across control modes, we chose to measure the mean square error (MSE) between the actual pitch angle and the guidancerecommended pitch angle following the mode transition. To compare the MSE component due to manual control with and without a LPR, the MSE was separately measured when the autopilot flew an entire LPR approach in the FA mode (no transition) for each approach geometry (map and direction). The result, 82.0 6.6 deg 2 (mean standard error of the mean (SEM)), varied slightly due to effects of approach geometry (map and approach direction) and time of the LPR. This mean value was subtracted from the average MSE from each run that included a LPR so that MSE data from LPR and non-LPR runs could be meaningfully compared. The average MSE for each control mode and LPR combination (across the four map repetitions) was calculated for each subject. A nonparametric Friedman test on the MSE before and after the transition tested the effect of the mode transition on manual control performance, as well as the effects of control mode and LPR following the transition. Although the pitch MSE performance metric is on a continuum, the data had separate clusters based on LPR/no LPR and occasional pilot "blunders" that were not classified as outliers but contributed to errors in addition to those of simple manual tracking. Both factors distorted the distribution. Fortunately, the counterpart nonparametric Friedman alternative gave significant, if weaker, results applicable to the distorted distribution.
The modified Bedford subjective mental workload ratings were analyzed by trial phase (before, during, and after the mode transition). For each of the 21 SA callouts, the percentage of correct callouts across subjects and trials was calculated and used as a temporal measure of situation awareness, with a higher percentage indicating better awareness of the state callout expected at that moment in time. Friedman tests were used to assess the subjects' agreement on which COMM indicator workload probes gave the longest response times, indicating the highest mental workload. The Friedman test was also applied to responses under LPR and control mode to analyze the agreement between subjects across independent variables. The modified Bedford workload ratings were analyzed across trial phase and situational awareness callouts over time within a trial. These within-subject comparisons using the Friedman test established each subject as their own control.
III. Results
A. Situation Awareness Verbal Callouts
We had hypothesized that SA verbal callout performance would decrease following a mode transition by an amount depending on the number of axes the subject was required to control after mode transition. Because the LPR approaches required the pilot to null large flight director errors, it was expected that SA on these trials would be lower due to distraction by the manual control task. Situation awareness verbal callout results, averaged across the LPR and no-LPR conditions, are shown in Fig. 2 . The abscissa plots each of the required verbal callouts in the nominal temporal order throughout each trial. The effect of mode change on the percentage of correct SA callouts was dramatic, and the change was consistently related to the number of axes being controlled following mode transition. All three SA curves in Fig. 2 exhibit a transient decrease after mode transition and then gradually recover, with the three-axis ROD case never approaching the pretransition, FA mode accuracy level. Note that the lowest percentages are associated with altitude callouts made immediately after the mode transition and with the subsequent three fuel-level callouts. When transitioning to manual flight, apparently the subjects tended to neglect the fuel-level display element, even though it was on the far left side of the PFD.
Overall, the subjects' rankings on the average percentage of correct callouts were concordant over all 21 subject reports (Friedman statistic 177.64, degrees of freedom df 20, p < 0.0005). The pairwise comparisons (before and after) showed that subjects agreed that the SA performance at four of the six callouts before the mode transition (450, 400, 350, and 300 ft) had significantly higher correct percentages than those callouts after the transition (300 ft vs posttransition callout: Friedman statistic ≥2.55, df 1, p ≤ 0.011). This indicates that the transition from a fully automatic to a manual control mode significantly reduced situation awareness, as measured by the percentage of correct verbal callouts. The effect of control mode change had a relatively consistent effect on SA: the relative ranks of the three control modes on the average percentage of correct SA callouts was concordant across subjects at 11 of the 21 callout points, all of them after the mode transition (Friedman statistic ≥7.51, df 2, p ≤ 0.023, un-Bonferroni corrected).
We were unable to demonstrate a significant additional effect of the LPR on the percentage of correct SA callouts, except immediately after the mode transition: SA callout performance decreased significantly in a concordant way across subjects at the two callouts immediately after the LPR/control mode transition (250 ft compared to 225 and 200 ft; Friedman statistic ≥3.12, df 1, p 0.004).
Once the subject had the vehicle stabilized on the new reference trajectory after the LPR, the SA at subsequent callouts apparently was similar to that without a LPR. 
B. Secondary Task Response Time Measures of Mental Workload
We had hypothesized that, after the transition to manual mode, the mental workload would transiently increase and then remain elevated, with the magnitude of the change depending on the number of axes being manually controlled and whether or not a LPR occurred. The results of the secondary task response time, averaged across the LPR and no-LPR conditions, are shown in Fig. 3 . Because the timing of each probe was deliberately varied over a 2 s interval, the abscissa is labeled by probe number. The transition to manual control occurred just before probe 4. (The legend shows the manual control mode after transition, but in all three cases, the control mode was FA before transition.) Pairwise comparisons of the response times in workload probes 1 through 3 (before transition) were found to be significantly lower than those in probes 4 through 10 (after transition) (Friedman statistic 5.14, df 1, p < 0.0005), demonstrating that mental workload increased after the mode change. The effect of probe sequence number was significant over all COMM indicator response probes (Friedman statistic 82.29, df 9, p < 0.0005), indicating that the subjects were in general agreement on which parts of the approach had the highest and lowest mental workloads.
The subjects' data were not concordant on the ranked effect of the manual control mode on average response time immediately after mode transition (probe 4). However, by probe 5, there was marginally significant agreement (Friedman statistic 5.69, df 2, p 0.058), and at probes 7 through 9, there was significant agreement (Friedman statistic ≥ 6.0, df 2, p 0.050). This suggests that, by the time of probe 7, a control mode effect emerged that was consistent across subjects. The curves indicate that the mental workload remains high for the three-axis ROD case and diminishes somewhat for the other manual modes. The curves, however, were not flat but remained essentially parallel across probe number after probe 5. This suggests that, if there indeed was such a cross effect of control mode × prode number, it was likely small or was masked by the variability in the data.
Contrary to our expectations, a Friedman test on the average response time across probes 4-7 showed no large and consistent effect of the LPR on mental workload as measured with our COMM secondary task. Using pairwise Friedman comparisons, the subjects agreed only marginally that the response times during trials with a LPR were larger than those without the LPR at probes 4 (Friedman statistic 3.77, df 1, p 0.052) and 7 (Friedman statistic 3.77, df 1, p 0.052).
C. Subjective Mental Workload
We hypothesized that the modified Bedford subjective mental workload reports, obtained retrospectively after each trial, would correspond to the secondary task data and increase following the mode transition in proportion to the number of axes being controlled and be higher for LPR approaches. We do not believe there were any recall problems on subjective mental workload reports due to short trial duration (approximately 75 s). The modified Bedford workload reports, when ranked, were consistent for all subjects for every combination of control mode and LPR. The subjects agreed that the "before," "after," and "during" workloads increased in that order (Friedman statistic 14.0, df 2, p 0.001). The subjects also agreed on the ranking of the effects of control mode within the "during" (Friedman statistic 26.0, df 2, p < 0.0005) and "after" phases (Friedman statistic 23.8, df 2, p < 0.0005) (Fig. 4) . [Similar to Fig. 3 , the results in Fig. 4 are presented such that, before the mode transition, the control mode (although fully automatic) is labeled as one of the manual modes for clarity.] All pairwise comparisons between phases were significant (p < 0.05). The modified Bedford workload reports shown in Fig. 4 were averaged across the LPR and no-LPR conditions because the LPR did not have a significant effect on the average modified Bedford reports in the "before" or "after" phases. However, the subjective modified Bedford data from the "during" phase did show a significant effect of LPR (Friedman statistic 8.33, df 1, p 0.003) , whereas the secondary task data during the transition phase (probes 4-6) did not.
D. Mode Transition and Redesignation Effects on Manual Control Performance
The MSE pitch angle error, with LPR run data corrected to remove the average autopilot component as described earlier, was calculated for each subject over the four repetitions of each mode and LPR combination. As expected, the pitch MSE was found to be greater after the transition than before (Friedman statistic 13.0, df 1, p < 0.0005). The pitch MSE values in the "after" phase were larger in trials a LPR than without one (Friedman statistic 13.0, df 1, p < 0.0005). The subjects were concordant in the finding that the MSE increased consistently from one-axis or three-axis (which were indistinguishable) to three-axis ROD when there was no LPR (Friedman statistic 7.38, df 2, p 0.025). Pairwise comparisons of the trials without a LPR found that one-axis and three-axis were not significantly different and that both were significantly less than three-axis ROD (Friedman statistic ≥ 2.50, df 1, p ≤ 0.013). The same trend was not seen when there was a LPR (Friedman statistic 4.77, df 2, p 0.092). With a LPR, only the comparison of one-axis and three-axis ROD was significant (Friedman statistic 2.29, df 1, p 0.013), and because the omnibus test was not, the significance of this pairwise comparison is also dubious. The lack of a significant result during the LPR trials could be due to the increased variance in the MSE during trials with a LPR. This was an unexpected result and made it more difficult to establish clearly the effects of control mode on the LPR trials. In a larger sample, it is expected that a significant effect of control mode on pitch axis MSE would be found for both LPR conditions.
The level of automation in the control mode significantly affected the average pitch axis MSE in runs without a LPR: one-axis had the least error, and three-axis ROD had the highest; but, there was no significant difference between the one-axis and three-axis modes. This result is consistent with previous single-and two-axis tracking task research [53] ; the difference recorded between one-axis and three-axis ROD, however, showed that there is a limit to the number of control axes that can be taken on in a mode transition without degrading performance. Trials with a LPR were only marginally affected by the control mode, which suggests a LPR × control mode cross effect. Reducing the number of axes controlled by the operator led to improved performance, improved SA, and lower workload: a more graceful transition.
IV. Conclusions
This study utilized several novel methods. As noted, secondary tasks have been widely employed to assess mental workload and spare attention. However, timing the visual stimuli to assess temporal variations in workload during automation mode transitions has not been previously attempted. The results using a two-choice visual response secondary task were congruent with retrospective modified Bedford workload ratings, but the former provided greater temporal resolution of effects during automation mode changes. The analysis of pilot verbal callouts in order to assess changes in situation awareness (SA) during the approach is also a new method. The results highlighted the loss of pilot attention to fuel status, altitude, and terrain during high workload periods due to the attentional demands of the manual control task. Those demands, which focused attention on the attitude indicator and nulling the flight director attitude errors, likely impaired their prospective memory: remembering to perform a planned action at the appropriate time. Additionally, the focus of attention on the center of the primary flight display (PFD) likely also hindered their ability to pay attention to critical fuel callouts, which were on the periphery.
As one would expect, the percentage of incorrect/missed callouts and mental workload were correlated, but the two measures did not track each other reliably. For example, mental workload remained elevated even for single-axis control although callout accuracy had substantially recovered. The nature of the landing task is such that educated guesses as to the vehicle altitude, fuel, or terrain status are inappropriate. Had the simulation been frozen after missed reports and blanked the displays, perhaps the subjects could have guessed their approximate altitude, fuel, and terrain status, but it is doubtful they could have made estimates with the required accuracy. Offloading the callout task to a nonflying pilot (as in Apollo) or to an automated fuel/altitude/terrain annunciator, thereby using a nonvisual information channel to communicate to the flying pilot, is an obvious workaround. The SA assessment methodology could also be used to explore alternative design placement of display elements related to SA variables. The technique has limitations because it is possible to assess only a limited number of situation awareness dimensions, as compared with the traditional scenariofreeze methods (e.g., Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique). However, the method is nonintrusive and has face validity because similar callouts were employed during the Apollo lunar landings.
The experiment demonstrated that, even when lunar landing autopilot mode transitions were expected and "automation surprise" and mode confusion were not contributing factors, transitions from fully automated supervisory control to various manual control modes increased mental workload metrics and decreased situation awareness measures. The changes were monotonic with the number of manual control loops the pilot was responsible for closing. Manual control performance, mental workload, and situation awareness metrics provide useful measures of the "gracefulness" of a mode transition. Because this was only a part task simulation conducted in a fixed-base simulator and the pilots were not astronauts, it was not attempted to define absolute criteria for gracefulness in terms of the maximum acceptable change in manual control performance, mental workload, and situation awareness callouts. However, setting criterion levels of performance, workload, and SA could be considered in an analogous real-world training situation. The research goal was to understand how the number of manual control loops closed impacted the time course of subsequent manual control performance, mental workload, and situation awareness, as well as the impact of a landing point redesignation.
Even though aided by an attitude flight director, flying in any of the three manual modes studied required far greater visual attention on the PFD attitude display than when simply monitoring the fully automatic mode, due to the sluggish dynamics of the simulated Altair lander. Assuming manual control increased both the objective mental workload (secondary COMM task response time) and subjective mental workload (modified Bedford ratings) measures. After the pilots completed their transition to manual flight by nulling the flight director errors, the subjective workload scores slightly improved, and the secondary task response times remained elevated by several seconds. Despite extensive training, the transition to manual control immediately reduced performance on the tertiary situation awareness callout task such that they missed altitude and fuel callouts, even when flying single axis. After the transition phase was completed, SA measures remained less accurate than before the manual control transition, particularly when manually controlling more than one axis. Presumably, the impaired callout performance was due to continuing preoccupation with the manual control task. These results illustrate the transient and steady-state costs of "getting into the loop," and indicate that the subjects at least transiently had lost most of their spare attention reserve. The subject pilots in this study flew the approach solely by reference to instruments (e.g., as they would if landing in darkness deep in a crater located near a lunar pole) and without an out-the-window view. If the same PFD information had been presented on a HUD, but a daylight window view of the landing area had also been available, arguably their attention would have been even further divided. A window view may improve important dimensions of SA, but because workload will be high when flying Altair manually, flight control and secondary task performance might be further compromised. Distributing the system and environmental monitoring tasks between two pilots and assuming manual control early enough so that the transient SA decrease has abated might provide an acceptable operational solution, if verified by higherfidelity simulations. Providing automated monitoring and callouts of fuel status, rate of descent, and altitude, or assigning these tasks to a nonflying pilot would also help. However, the fundamental problem potentially results from Altair LDAC1-Delta's sluggish rate command-attitude hold (RCAH) manual control dynamics, which effectively change from first-order to second-order control of attitude when large control inputs are employed and afford only limited control authority. Manual control dynamics can largely be tuned to mission requirements. RCAH control of attitude is appropriate in orbit and during the initial phases of lunar landing approaches. However, during the final vertical phases of approach to touchdown, even if RCAH lag can be reduced, based on the results, a transition to incremental horizontal translational velocity control (TVC) is recommended. TVC (also known as "translational rate command" or "auxiliary hover trim") and hover position hold modes have become widely utilized in modern search-and-rescue helicopters and analogous modes have been proposed for lander spacecraft. Experimental comparisons should demonstrate that transitions to TVC rather than sluggish RCAH significantly reduces pilot workload (and hence permit an increase in SA) during the final safety critical phases of the approach.
The focus was defining the transient effects on performance, workload, and SA during the transition from full automation to alternative manual modes. However, this method could be adapted to study performance, workload, and situation awareness transients during transitions at higher levels of automation and other applications, e.g., powerplant or ATC applications. As demonstrated in a previous study of steady-state effects, one cannot assume that performance, workload, and situation awareness always improve when transitioning from a lower to a higher level of supervisory control because certain aspects of situation awareness may be enhanced by involvement in lower level tasks.
The primary manual control task workload and overall situation awareness are naturally inversely related. When a transition to a manual mode takes place, the balance between them is perturbed, and the operator must find a way to bring both back to an acceptable balance. Vehicle manual control dynamics, cockpit controls, and displays must be designed using manual and supervisory control theories and cognitive task analysis and then verified using quantitative human-in-the-loop simulations to be sure that, when mode changes occur, they are "graceful" and that workload, task performance, and situation awareness always remain within acceptable limits.
